The Spanish Government

Objectionable office-holders

In our colonies, appointments and command far from being sought as a means to obtain a good reputation, or as affording opportunities of contributing to public prosperity, are, it is too well known, only solicited with a view to amass wealth, and then retire for the purpose of enjoying it.

Commercial pursuits being besides attended with so many advantages that those only decline following them who are divested of money and friends; whilst the situation in the revenue are so few in number, compared with the many candidates who solicit them, that they are consequently well appointed, it follows that the excess left without occupation, besides being considerable, is generally composed of needy persons, and not the most suitable to exercise the delicate functions of collectors and magistrates in the provinces. From this class nevertheless the host of officers are usually taken who, under the name of collectors, surveyors and assessors of tributes, intervene in, or influence the public administration.

Owing to the variety and great number of persons emigrating to America, ample field, no doubt, is there left for selection, by which means the viceroys may frequently meet with persons suitable and adequate to the above trusts, if prudent steps are only taken; but in this respect the case is very different in the Philippines, where chance alone occasionally brings over a European Spaniard, unemployed or friendless. In these remote Islands, also, more than in any other quarter, people seek to live in idleness, and, as much as possible, without working, or much trouble.

As long as hopes are entertained of doing something in the Acapulco speculations, every other pursuit is viewed with indifference, and the office of district or provincial magistrate is only solicited when all other resources have failed, or as a remedy against want. As the applicants for these situations are therefore not among the most select classes, it very frequently happens that they fall into extremely improper and unworthy hands.

It is in fact common enough to see a hairdresser or a lackey converted into a governor; a sailor or a deserter transformed into a district magistrate, collector, or military commander of a populous province, without any other counsellor than his own crude understanding, or any other guide than his passion.

Such a metamorphosis would excite laughter in a comedy or farce; but, realized [427]in the theatre of human life, it must give rise to sensations of a very different nature. Who is there that does not feel horror-struck, and tremble for the innocent, when he sees a being of this kind transferred from the yard-arm to the seat of justice, deciding, in the first instance, on the honor, lives, and property of a hundred thousand persons, and haughtily exacting the homage and incense of the spiritual ministers of the towns under his jurisdiction, as well as of the parish curates, respectable for their acquirements and benevolence, and who, in their own native places, would possibly have rejected as a servant the very man whom in the Philippines they are compelled to court and obey as a sovereign.

In vain do the laws ordain that such offices shall not be given away to attendants on governors and members of the high court of justice, for under pretext of the scarcity of Europeans experienced in the colony, means are found to elude the statute, by converting this plea into an exception in favor of this description of persons. By such important offices being filled in this manner, it is easy to conceive the various hardships to which many of the provinces and districts are exposed; nor can any amelioration be expected as long as this plan is persisted in and the excesses of the parties go without punishment.

Evils from officials in trade.Independent, however, of the serious injuries and great errors persons of the class above described cannot fail to commit in the exercise of their functions, purely judicial, the consequences of their inordinate avarice are still more lamentable, and the tacit permission to satisfy it, granted to them by the government under the specious title of a licence to trade. Hence may it be affirmed, that the first of the evils, and the one the native immediately feels, is occasioned by the very person the law has destined for his relief and protection. In a word, he experiences injuries from the civil magistrates presiding over the provinces, who, at the same time, are the natural enemies of the inhabitants, and the real oppressors of their industry.

It is a known and melancholy fact that, far from promoting the felicity of the provinces intrusted to their care, the magistrates attend to nothing else but their own fortunes and personal interests; nor do they hesitate as to the means by which their object is to be attained. Scarcely are they seated in the place of authority, when they become the chief consumers, purchasers, and exporters of every thing produced and manufactured within the districts under their command, thus converting their licence to trade into a positive monopoly. In all lucrative speculations the magistrate seeks to have the largest share; in all his enterprises he calls in the forced [428]aid of his subjects, and if he deigns to remunerate their labor, at most it is only on the same terms as if they had been working on account of the king. These unhappy people bring in their produce and crude manufactures to the very person who, directly or indirectly, is to fix upon them an arbitrary value. To offer such and such a price for the articles is the same as to say, another bidding shall not be made. To insinuate is to command—the native is not allowed to hesitate, he must either please the magistrate, or submit to his persecutions. Being besides free from all competition in the prosecution of his traffic, since he is frequently the only Spaniard resident in the province, the magistrate therein acts with unbounded sway, without dread, and almost without risk of his tyranny ever being denounced to the superior tribunals.

Speculating in tributes.

In order, however, that a more correct idea may be formed of the iniquitous conduct of many of these public functionaries, it is necessary to lay open some part of their irregular dealings in the collection of the Indian tributes. It is well known that the government, anxious to conciliate the interests of the tributary classes with those of the revenue, frequently commutes the pecuniary capitation tax into an obligation to pay the amount in produce or manufactures.

A season comes when, owing to the failure of the crops, the productions have risen to an excessive price, and consequently infinitely above the ordinary rates affixed by law, which are generally the lowest, and the natives, unable to keep their bargains without considerable injury or endangering the subsistence of their numerous families, implore the favor of the magistrate, petitioning him to lay their calamitous situation before the superior government, in order to have the payment of their tribute in kind remitted, and offering to pay it in money. This is the precise moment when, as his own profits depend on the misery of the province under his command, he endeavors to misuse the accidental power with which he is invested.

Hence it happens that, instead of acting as a beneficent mediator, and supporting the just solicitations of the natives, he at first disregards their petition, and then all at once transforming himself into a zealous collector, issues his notifications, sends his satellites into the very fields to seize on the produce, and in a most inexorable manner insists on collecting till necessity compels him to suspend the measure. The principal object being attained, that is, having now become master of the gleanings and scanty crops of his bereft subjects, on a sudden his disposition changes, he is moved to pity, and in the most pathetic language describes to the government the ravages done to the plantations by the hurricanes, and the [429]utter impossibility of collecting in the tributes that year in kind. On such a remonstrance he easily obtains permission to change the standing order, and proceeding on to collect in some of the remaining tributes in money, merely to save appearance, with perfect impunity he puts the finishing stroke to the wicked act he had commenced, by applying to himself all the produce his collectors had gathered in, and places to the credit of the treasury the total amount of the tributes, corresponding to his jurisdiction, in money.

Supposing, for example, that this has happened in the province of Antique, where the payment of the capitation-tax generally takes place in the unhusked rice, rated at two reals per cavan, and, through the effects of a bad season, this article should rise as high as ten or twelve reals. It is clear that the magistrate, by accounting for the tributes with the revenue office in money, and collecting them in kind at the rate fixed by law, would by the sales gain a profit of 400 or 500 per cent; at the same time the native, by the mere circumstance of then paying in kind, would have paid the tribute corresponding to five or six years in a single one, without, on that account, having freed himself from the same charge in the following seasons.

No check on extortion.When the extortionate acts as these are practised, to what lengths may it not be expected the other excesses and abuses of authority are carried? To the above it ought moreover to be added, that the provincial magistrates have no lieutenants, and are unprovided with any other auxiliaries in the administration of justice, except an accompanying witness and a native director; that the scrutinies of their accounts, to which they formerly were subject, are now abolished, and, in short, that they have no check upon them, or indeed any other persons to bear testimony to their irregularities, except the friendless and miserable victims of their despotism and avarice.

Notwithstanding, however, what is above stated, it sometimes happens that a magistrate is to be met with, distinguished from the rest by his prudence and good conduct; but this is a miracle, for by the very circumstance of his being allowed to trade, he is placed in a situation to abuse the wide powers confided to him, and preferably to attend to his personal interests; in fact, if the principle is in itself defective, it must naturally be expected the consequences will be equally baneful. The lamentable abuses here noticed are but too true, as well as many others passed over in silence; and the worst of all is, that there is no hope of remedying them thoroughly, unless the present system of interior administration is altogether changed. In vain would it be to allege the possibility of removing the evil [430]by the timely and energetic interposition of the protector of the natives; for although this office is in itself highly respectable, it cannot in any way reach the multitude of excesses committed, and much less prevent them; not only because the minister who exercises it resides in the city, where complaints are seldom brought in, unless they come through the channel of the parish curates; but also on account of the difficulty of fully establishing the charges against the magistrates, in the way the natives are at present depressed by fear and threats, as well as restrained by the sub-governors and other inferior officers of justice, who, being dependent upon, and holding their situations from the magistrates, are interested in their monopolies and extortionate acts being kept from public view.

Less complaisant laws needed.

If, therefore, it is not possible entirely to eradicate the vices under which the interior administration of these Islands labors, owing to the difficulty of finding persons possessed of the necessary virtues and talents to govern, in an upright and judicious manner, let us at least prevent the evils out of the too great condescension of our own laws. In the infancy of colonies, it has been the maxim of all governments to encourage the emigration and settlement of inhabitants from the mother-country, without paying much attention to the means by which this was to be done. It was not to be wondered at that, for reasons of state, defects were overlooked,—at such periods were even deemed necessary. Hence the relaxation in the laws in favor of those who, quitting their native land, carried over with them to strange countries their property and acquirements. Hence, no doubt, also are derived the full powers granted to those who took in charge the subjection and administration of the new provinces, in order that they might govern, and at the same time carry on their traffic with the natives, notwithstanding the manifest incompatibility of the two occupations; or rather, the certainty that ought to have been foreseen that public duties would generally be postponed, when placed in competition with private interests and the anxious desire of acquiring wealth.

Subsequently that happened which was, in fact, to be dreaded, viz., what at first was tolerated as a necessary evil, sanctioned by the lapse of time has at length become a legitimate right, or rather a compensation for the supposed trouble attached to the fulfillment of the duties of civil magistrates; whilst they, as already observed, think of nothing but themselves, and undergo no other trouble or inconvenience than usually fall on the lot of any other private merchant. In the Philippines, at least, many years having elapsed since the natives peaceably submitted to the dominion of the king, every [431]motive has ceased that could formerly, and in a certain degree, justify the indulgence so much abused, at the same time that no plausible pretext whatever exists for its further continuation.

Although hitherto the number of whites, compared to that of the people of color, has not been great, as the whole of the provincial magistracies, collectorships, and subaltern governments, do not exceed twenty-seven, the scarcity of Spaniards ought not to be alleged as a sufficient reason; nor can it be doubted these situations might at any time be properly filled, if the person on whom the choice should fall were only certain of living with decency and in a suitable manner, without being carried away with the flattering hopes of withdrawing from office, with ten, twenty, and even as high as fifty thousand dollars of property, as has heretofore been the case, but satisfied with a due and equivalent salary they might receive as a reward for the public services they perform.

I do not therefore see why the government should hesitate in resolving to put a stop to evils which the people of the Philippines have not ceased to deplore from the time of the conquest, by proscribing, under the most severe penalties, the power of trading, as now exercised by the provincial magistrates. The time is come when this struggle between duty and sordid interest ought to end, and reason, as well as enlightened policy, demand that in this respect our legislation should be reformed, in order that the mace of justice, instead of being prostituted in search of lucre, may henceforwards be wholly employed in the support of equity and the protection of society.

Urgence of reform.The only objection which, at first sight, might be started against the suggestions here thrown out is the increased expense which would fall on the treasury, owing to the necessity of appropriating competent salaries for the interior magistrates under the new order of things. Independent, however, of the fact that the rapid improvements the provinces must assume, in every point of view, would superabundantly make up this trifling difference; yet supposing the sacrifice were gratuitous, and even of some moment, it ought not, on that account, to be omitted, since there is no public object more important to the sovereign himself, than to make the necessary provision for the decorum of the magistracy, the due administration of justice, and the maintenance of good order among his subjects.

The position being established, that a number of whites more than sufficient might be obtained, eligible and fit to perform the duties of civil magistrates, which they would be induced to undertake, [432]if adequate terms were only proposed, it would seem that no ill consequences might be expected from at once assimilating the regulations of these provincial judicatures to those of the corregimientos, or mayoralties of towns in Spain, or in making out an express statute, on a triple scale, for three classes of magistrates, granting to them emoluments equivalent to the greater or lesser extent of the respective jurisdictions. As far as regards the pay, it ought to be so arranged as to act as a sufficient stimulus to induce European colonists to embrace this career, in a fixed and permanent way, which hitherto they have only resorted to as a five years’ speculation.

Conformably to this suggestion, and owing to the lesser value attached to money in India, compared with Europe, on account of the greater abundance of the necessaries of life, I am of opinion that it would be expedient to affix an annual allowance of $2,000 to each of the appointments of the six principal and most populous provinces, $1,500 for the next in importance, and for the twelve or thirteen remaining, at the rate of $1,000 each; leaving to the candidates the option of rising according to their length of services and good conduct, from the lowest to the highest, as is the case in Spain.

Objects to be gained.

The first part of the plan above pointed out embraces two objects. The one is to prevent the provincial magistrates from carrying on traffic, thus depriving them of every pretext to defraud the natives of what is their own; and the other, to form, in the course of a few years a class of men hitherto unknown in the Philippine Islands, who, taught by practice, may be enabled to govern the provinces in a more correct and regular manner, and acquire more extended knowledge, especially in the judicial proceedings of the first instance, which, owing to this defect, frequently compel the litigants to incur useless expenses, and greatly embarrass the ordinary course of justice.

Although the second part at first seems to involve an increased expense of $36,000 or $37,000 annually, when well considered, this sum will be found not to exceed $20,000, because it will be necessary to deduct from the above estimate the amount of 3% under the existing regulations allowed to the magistrates for the collection of the native tributes, in their character of subdelegates, generally amounting to $16,000 or $17,000; besides only taking into account such real and effective disbursements or extraordinary expenses as in fact they may legally have incurred in the performance of their duties.

Should it, however, be deemed expedient, from causes just in their nature, hereafter to exonerate the natives from the obligations of paying tributes, by which means the amount deducted for the three [433]per cent. commission could not then be brought into account, let me be allowed to ask what enlightened government would hesitate submitting to an additional expense of so trifling an import, in exchange for beholding more than two millions of men forever freed from the extortionate acts of their old magistrates; and, through the effects of the new regulations, the latter converted into real fathers of the people over whom they are placed? How different would then be the aspect these fine provinces would present to the eyes of the philosophical observer who would, in that case, be able to calculate to what an extent the progress of agriculture and industry in these islands might be carried.

Demoralization of over-seas service.Nevertheless, I do not wish to insinuate that by the better organization of the provincial governments, the present irregularities and abuses of authority would entirely cease; because I am aware, more especially in the Indies, that the persons who hold public situations usually have too exaggerated ideas of their own personal importance, and easily mistake the gratification of their own whims for firmness of character, in the necessity of causing themselves to be respected. Still it is an incontestable fact that, by removing the chief temptation, and rescinding altogether the license to trade, the just complaints preferred by the native against the Spaniard would cease; the motives of those continual disputes which arise between the magistrates and the ministers of the gospel exercising their functions in the same provinces, and the zealous defenders of the rights of their parishioners, would be removed, and the inhabitants of Manila, extending their mercantile operations to the interior, without the dread of seeing them obstructed through the powerful competition of the magistrates in authority there, would be induced to settle in or connect themselves with the provinces, and thus diffuse their knowledge, activity and money among the inhabitants, the true means of encouraging the whole.

What has already been said will suffice to convince the lover of truth and the friend of general prosperity, how urgent it is to introduce as early as possible, the reform proposed into the interior administration of this important, although neglected colony; and it is to be hoped that the government, guided by these same sentiments, will not be led away by those narrow-minded people, who predict danger from every thing that is new; but, after due and mature deliberation, resolve to adopt a measure dictated by reason, and at the same time conformable to the best interests of the state.

[434]Of little avail would have been the valor and constancy with which Legaspi and his worthy companions overcame the natives of these islands, if the apostolic zeal of the missionaries had not seconded their exertions, and aided to consolidate the enterprise. The latter were the real conquerors; they who, without any other arms than their virtues, won over the good will of the islanders, caused the Spanish name to be beloved, and gave to the king, as it were by a miracle, two millions more of submissive and Christian subjects. These were the legislators of the barbarous hordes who inhabited the islands of this immense Archipelago, realizing, by their mild persuasion, the allegorical prodigies of Amphion and Orpheus.

Pioneer Philippine government a theocracy.As the means the missionaries called in to their aid, in order to reduce and civilize the Indians, were preaching and other spiritual labors, and, although scattered about and acting separately, they were still subject to the authority of their prelates, who, like so many chiefs, directed the grand work of conversion, the government primitively established in these colonies must necessarily have partaken greatly of the theocratical order, and beyond doubt it continued to be so, till, by the lapse of time, the number of colonists increased, as well as the effective strength of the royal authority, so as to render the governing system uniform with that established in the other ultramarine dominions of Spain.

This is also deduced from the fragments still remaining of the first constitution, or mode of government introduced in the Batanes Islands and missions of Cagayan, administered by the Dominican friars in a spiritual and temporal manner; as well as from what may frequently be observed in the other provinces, by any one who bestows the smallest attention. Although the civil magistracies have since been regulated, and their respective attributes determined with due precision, it has not hitherto been possible, notwithstanding the pains taken to make the contrary appear, to do without the personal authority and influence the parish curates possess over their flocks. The government has, in fact, constantly been obliged to avail themselves of this aid, as the most powerful instrument to insure respect and a due subordination, in such manner that, although the parish curates are not at present equally authorized to interfere in the civil administration, in point of fact, they are themselves the real administrators.

Standing of parish priests.

The parish curate is:

• the consoler of the afflicted
• the peacemaker of families
• the promoter of useful ideas
• the preacher and example of everything good.

; as in him liberality is seen to shine, and the Indians behold him alone in the midst of them, without relatives, without traffic, and always busied in their care and improvement, they become accustomed to live satisfied and contented under his paternal direction, and deliver up to him the whole of their confidence.

In this way, rendered the master of their wishes, nothing is done without the advice, or rather consent, of the curate. The subaltern governor, on receiving an order from the superior magistrate, before he takes any step, goes to the minister to obtain his sanction, and it is he in fact who tacitly gives the mandate for execution, or prevents its being carried into effect.

As the father of his flock, he arranges, or directs, the lawsuits of his parishioners; it is he who draws out their writings; goes to the capital to plead for the Indians; opposes his prayers, and sometimes his threats, to the violent acts of the provincial magistrates, and arranges every thing in the most fit and quiet manner.

The parish curate is the simplest human institution yet is the most firmly established. It gives many advantages to the state. ,, as the one so justly admired in the spiritual ministry of these islands.

It may therefore be considered a strange fatality, when the secret and true art of governing a colony, so different from any other as is that of the Philippines, consists in the wise use of so powerful an instrument as the one just described, that the superior government, within the last few years, should have been so much deluded as to seek the destruction of a work which, on the contrary, it is, above all others, advisable to sustain.

In this, as well as many other cases, we see how difficult, or rather how absurd it is, to expect to organize a system of government, indistinctly adapted to the genius and disposition of all nations, however great the discordance prevailing in their physical and moral constitutions.

Hence it follows that, by wishing to assimilate the administrative plan of these provinces to the one adopted in the sections of America, inconveniences are unceasingly met with, evidently arising out of this erroneous principle. Whatever may be asserted to the contrary, there is no medium.

It is necessary to insure obedience either through dread and force, or respect must be excited by means of love and confidence.

In order to be convinced that the first is not practicable, it will only be necessary to weigh well the following circumstances and reflections.

The number of the whites compared to that of the natives is so small – 15 to 25,000.

These provinces, infinitely more populous than those of America, are entirely delivered up to the charge of provincial [436]Friars only check on officials.magistrates, who carry with them to the seats of their respective governments, no other troops than the title of military commandants, and their royal commission on parchment.

Besides the friars, it sometimes happens that no other white person is to be found in an entire province, but the presiding magistrate. It is the duty of the latter to collect in the king’s revenue; to pursue robbers; appease tumults; raise men for the regiments in garrison at Manila and Cavite; regulate and head his people in case of an external invasion, and, in short, it is he who is to do everything in the character of magistrate and in the name of the king.

Considering, therefore, the effective power required for the due performance of so great a variety of duties, and the want of that species of support experienced by him who is charged with them, can it be denied that it would be risking the security of these dominions too much, to attempt forcibly to control them with means so insufficient?

If the inhabitants become tumultuous and rise up, on whom will the magistrate call for aid to repress and punish them? In such a predicament, is any other alternative left him than to fly or die in the struggle? If among civilized nations, it is deemed indispensable that authority should always appear accompanied with force, how can it be expected, among Indians, that the laws will otherwise be respected, when left naked and unsupported?