Jolo

The Island of Jolo is small compared to that of Mindanao.

It is, nevertheless, in itself the most important, as well as the real hotbed of all the piracies committed.

Its inhabitants, according to the unanimous reports of captives and various merchants, in skill and valor greatly exceed the other Muslims who infest these seas.

The sultan is absolute. His subjects carry on trade with Borneo, Celebes, and the other Malayan tribes scattered about this great Archipelago.

In the port of Jolo, as already noticed, sales are made of Christians captured by the other Moros. The Chinese of Amoy, as well as the Dutch and British, carry them manufactured goods, opium and arms, receiving, in return, black pepper, bees’ wax, balato, edible nests, tortoise-shell, mother-of-pearl, gold dust, pearls, etc., and from Manila also a vessel usually goes once a year with goods; but all act with the greatest precaution in this dangerous traffic, guarding, as much as possible, against the insidious acts of that perfidious government.

The great number of renegades, of all casts, who have successively naturalized themselves there; the abundance of arms, and the prevailing opulence, have, in every respect, contributed to render this Island a formidable and powerful state. The capital is surrounded with forts and thick walls, and the famous heights, standing near it, in case of emergency, afford a secure asylum where the women can take refuge and the treasures of the sultan and public be deposited, whilst in the plains below the contest may be maintained by more than 50,000 combatants, already very dexterous in the use of the musket and of a bold and courageous character. The navy of these Islanders is also very respectable, for, besides a great number of smaller prows and war-boats, they have some of a large size, capable of carrying heavy artillery on their decks, mounted on corresponding carriages, and not suspended in slings as is the custom of the people of Mindanao. In a word, Jolo is an Island governed by a system of administration extremely vigorous and decisive; dread and superstition sustain [450]the throne of the tyrant, and the fame of his greatness frequently brings to his feet the ulemas, or missionaries of the Koran, even as far as from the furthest margin of the Red Sea.

The prince and people, unanimous in the implacable odium with which they view all Christians, cannot be divided or kept on terms of peace; and if it is really wished to free these seas from the evils and great dangers with which they are at all times threatened, it is necessary at once to strike at the root, by landing and attacking the Jolonese in their strongholds, and break the charm by which they are held together.

This, at least, is the constant and unshaken opinion of all experienced persons and those versed in Philippine affairs; and if, by the substantial reasons and existing circumstances, I convince myself sufficiently to openly recommend war to be undertaken against the Moros and pushed with the utmost vigor, and more particularly commencing the work by a formal invasion of Jolo; still, as I feel myself incompetent to trace a precise plan, or to discuss the minute details more immediately connected with the object, I feel it necessary to confine myself to the pointing out, in general terms, of the means I judge most conducive to the happy issue of so arduous but important an enterprise, leaving the rest to more able and experienced hands.

Council of war recommended.As a previous step, I conceive that a council of war ought to be formed in Manila, composed of the captain-general, the commanders of the navy, artillery, and engineer department, as well as of the regular corps, who, in conformity to all the antecedent information lodged in the secretary’s office for the captain-generalship, and the previous report of some one of the ex-governors of Zamboanga and the best informed missionaries, may be enabled to deliberate and proceed on to a mature examination of the whole affair, taking into their special consideration everything regarding Jolo, its early reduction, the number of vessels and men required for this purpose, the most advantageous points of attack, and the best season in which this can be carried into execution. After all these matters have been determined upon, the operation in question ought to be connected with the other partial and general arrangements of the government, in order that a plan the best adapted to localities and existing circumstances may be chosen, and without its being necessary to wait for the king’s approbation of the means resolved upon, owing to the distance of the court and the necessity of acting with celerity. If, however, on account of the deference in every respect due to the sovereign, it should be thought proper to reconcile his previous sanction with the necessity of acting without loss of time, the best [451]mode would be to send from Spain an officer of high rank, fully authorized, who, as practised on other occasions, might give his sanction, in the name of the king, to the resolutions adopted by the council of war, and take under his own immediate charge, if it should be so deemed expedient, the command of the expedition against Jolo, receiving the appointment of governor of the Island, as soon as the conquest should be carried into effect, as a just reward for his zeal and valor.

War popular in Philippines.

Supposing an uniformity of opinions to prevail with regard to the expediency of attempting the subjugation of Jolo, and supposing also the existence of the necessary funds to meet the expenses of a corresponding armament, it may be positively relied upon that the project would be extremely popular, and meet with the entire concurrence and support of the Philippine Islands. The military men, aware of the great riches known to exist in the proposed theatre of operations, would emulously come forward to offer their services, under a hope of sharing the booty, and the warlike natives of the Bisayas would be impelled on by their hatred to the Moros, and their ardent wishes to avenge the blood of their fathers and children. On the other hand, the abundance of regular and well disciplined officers and troops, at present in the colony and the number of gun-boats found in the ports, a want of which, on other occasions, has always been experienced, will afford ample scope for the equipment of a force competent to the important enterprise in view. In fact, if the operation is arranged in a systematic manner, and all the precautions and rules observed as are usual in cases of attacks premeditated against European and civilized establishments, there is no reason to expect any other than a flattering and decisive result, since, in reality, the whole would be directed against an enemy contemptible on account of his barbarism and his comparative ignorance of the art of war.

Native assistance.The preparations deemed necessary being made in Manila, and the Bisayan auxiliaries assembled beforehand in Zamboanga, with their arms and respective chiefs, the whole of the operation in question, it may be safely said, might be terminated within the period of three or four months. Supposing even 2,000 regular troops are destined for this expedition, with a corresponding train of field pieces, and at the moment there should not be found in the Islands a sufficient number of larger vessels to embargo or freight for their conveyance, a competent quantity of coasters, galleys and small craft might be met with at any time sufficiently capacious and secure to carry the men. This substitute will be found the less [452]inconvenient, because, as the navigation is to be performed among the Islands during the prevalence of the north winds, usually a favorable and steady season of the year, the voyage will consequently be safe and easy. It will also be possible to arrive at the point agreed upon, as a general rendezvous, in twenty, or five-and-twenty days, which place, for many reasons, ought to be the fortress of Zamboanga, situated in front of Jolo and at moderate distance from that Island; it being from this port that, in former times, the Philippine governors usually sent out their armaments, destined to make war against the Basilanese and Jolonese.

Mindanao also needs attention.As soon as this important and memorable enterprise has been carried into effect, and the punishment and total subjugation of these faithless Mahometans completed and the new conquest placed under a military authority, in the mean time that the lands are distributing and arrangements making to establish the civil administration, on the same plan followed in the other provinces of the Philippine government, the armament ought to return to Zamboanga with all possible speed; but, after stopping by the way to reduce the small island of Basilan and leaving a fortress and garrison there. Immediately afterwards, and before the various tribes of Moros inhabiting the Island of Mindanao have been able to concert among themselves and prepare for their defence, it would be advisable to direct partial expeditions towards both flanks of Zamboanga, for the purpose of burning the settlements of the natives and driving them from the shores into the interior. Forts ought then to be raised at the mouths of the inlets and rivers, and a fourth district government formed in the southern part of the island; in such manner that, by possession being taken of the coasts, the government and district of Zamboanga may be placed in contact with the new one established on the one side, and on the other with the district of Misamis, also the new district with that of Caraga, the western part of which territory is already united to that of Misamis. Such, at least, was the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Don Mariano Tobias, an officer deservedly celebrated for his prudence and consummate skill in these matters, and this he substantially expressed in a council of war, held on August 28, 1778, for the purpose of deliberating on the most advisable means to check the Moros, as appears by a long and intelligent report drawn upon this subject on April 26, 1800, by the adjutant-general of this colony, Don Rufino Suarez.

In case it should be determined to adopt the means proposed by Colonel Tobias, for the purpose of holding the Moros of Mindanao in check, and to which, unfortunately, due regard has not hitherto [453]been paid, notwithstanding the enterprise presents very few difficulties, owing to the little opposition to be expected from the infidel natives, the latter would then be left completely surrounded and shut up in the heart of the island, and their active system of privateering, with which they have so many years infested these seas, entirely destroyed. If, through the want of garrisons and population, it should not, however, be possible to deprive them of all their outlets, by which means they would still be able occasionally to send some of their cruising vessels, nevertheless there would be facilities with which it would be possible to pursue and counteract the ravages of the few pirates who might furtively escape out of some river, while now they are fitted out, and well manned and armed to the number of one and two hundred war-boats, openly in their ports.

A plan for future policing.After the emporiums of slavery have been destroyed by the conquest of Jolo, and the other general measures adopted, as above pointed out, the government would then be in a situation to turn its attention, with much greater ease, to the arrangement of all the other minor schemes of precaution and protection suited to the difference of circumstances and locality, without the concurrence of which the work would be left imperfect, and in some degree the existence of those settled in the new establishments rendered precarious. As, however, I am unprepared minutely to point out the nature of these measures, or distinctly to lay down a ground-work for future civilization and improvement, I shall merely observe, that what would then remain to be done would neither require any great capital, or present obstacles which might not easily be overcome. The Moros being then concentrated in the Island of Mindanao, and this completely surrounded on all sides by our forts and settlements, in the manner above described, the only enemies let loose on these seas would be either the few who might, from time to time, elude the vigilance of our troops and district-commanders, or those who might have escaped from Jolo previous to its conquest, and taken up their abode in one or other of the Bisayas Islands; or, in short, such as are out cruising at the time our armament returns to Zamboanga and takes possession of the southern coast of Mindanao; in which case they would be compelled to resort to a roving life, establishing, like the Jolo fugitives, temporary dwellings among the mangroves and thickets bordering on the shore.

The principal objects then remaining for the attention of government would be to guard and protect the towns and settlements established on the coasts from the insults and inroads of banditti, impelled by necessity or despair, and at the same time to promote [454]the gradual overthrow or civilization of the dispersed remnant of Moorish population left in the Island. The cruising of the pirates being thus reduced to a space comprehended in an oblong circle formed by an imaginary line drawn from the southern extreme of the Island of Leyte, to the south-west point of Samar, which next running along the north-west coast of Mindoro, on the outside of Tacao and Burias, and coming down to the west of Panay, Negros and Bohol, closes the oval at the little island formed by the Strait of Panaon, about forty gunboats might be advantageously stationed in the narrowest passages from land to land; as, for example, in the Strait of San Juanico and other passes of a similar kind, well known to the local pilots. By this means, the limits would be gradually contracted. Various small naval armaments ought, at the same time, to keep cruising in the center of this circle, pursuing the Moros by sea and land, dislodging them from their strongholds and lurking places, and sending on those who might be captured to the depot pointed out by government.

Feasibility of plans.The first part of the plan would be the more easily realized, as it is well-known that most of the districts corresponding to the Bisayan tribes, including those of Camarines and Albay, situated at the extremity of the island of Luzon, have several gunboats of their own, which might be used with great advantage. By merely advancing and stationing them in such channels as the Moros must necessarily pass, either in going out or returning, according to the different monsoons, they would easily be checked, without removing the gunboats to any great distance from their own coasts. As besides the great advantages resulting from this plan and every one doing his duty are apparent, no doubt numbers of natives would volunteer their services, more particularly if they were liberally rewarded, and their maintenance provided from the funds of the respective communities. Moreover, the points which at first should not be considered as sufficiently guarded might be strengthened by the king’s gunboats, and, indeed, in all of them it would be advisable to station some of the latter, commanded by a select officer, to whose orders the captains of the provincial gunboats ought to be made subservient.

With regard to the second part, it will suffice to observe that the captain-generalship of the Philippine Islands already possesses as many as seventy gunboats, besides a considerable number of gallies and launches, which altogether constitute a formidable squadron of light vessels; and, after deducting those deemed necessary for the protection of Jolo and the new province to be established [455]in Mindanao, a sufficient number would still be left to carry into execution all the objects proposed. At present, although the Moros navigate in numerous divions, and with a confidence inspired by their undisturbed prosperity, a 24-pounder shot from one of our launches is nevertheless sufficient to put them to flight; what therefore may not be expected when their forces shall be so greatly diminished and their apprehensions increased, of being defeated and captured? Nevertheless, as it is not easy for our gunboats to come up with them, when giving chase, it would be advisable to add to our cruisers a temporary establishment of prows and light vessels, manned by Bisayan Indians, which, by advancing on with the gallies, might attack the enemy and give time for the gunboats to come up and decide the action. Besides as the Bisayan Indians are perfectly acquainted with the mode of making war on the Moros, the meaning of their signals and manoeuvers and the kind of places on shore in which they take shelter when pursued at sea, the employment of such auxiliaries would be extremely useful.

Need of undivided leadership.The whole of these defensive and offensive arrangements would, however, be ineffectual or incomplete in their results, if the most perfect union and concert is not established in every part, so that all should conspire to the same object, although by distinct means.

In order therefore that the necessary harmony may be secured, it would be expedient to remove the chief authority nearer to the theater of war, by confiding all the necessary instructions and powers to the person who might be selected for the direction and command of the enterprise, after the general plan of operations had been regularly approved.

Under this impression, and with a view to the better execution of all the details, it would be advisable for the commanding officer, named by the government, to take up his headquarters in the Island of Panay, which, owing to its geographical situation, the great number of towns and inhabitants contained in the three provinces into which it is divided, as well as other political reasons, is generally esteemed preferable for the object in question, to the Island of Zebu, where, in former times, the commanders of the province of the painted natives resided, as mentioned in the laws of the Indies. The center of action being placed in Iloilo, a communication with the other points would thus more easily be kept open, aid and relief might be sent more rapidly to the quarter where required, and, in a word, all the movements, of whatsoever kind they might be, would be executed with greater precision and certainty of success. It would be unnecessary to add that the provincial magistrates of Camarines and Albay ought to co-operate, [456]with their fourteen gunboats and other smaller vessels, in the measures adopted by the commander of the Bisayan establishment, distributing their forces according to the orders given by him, and by undertaking to guard the straits of San Bernardino.