Matelief

Memoir by Admiral C. Matelief, on the subject of the condition and the commerce of the Indies

The Spaniards and the Portuguese are our adversaries.

More than a century ago they began to establish themselves there. They have gained an entrance into several countries, where they have fortresses, many men, and an established government. Consequently they are enabled to attend to their business with greater certainty and by more convenient methods than we, for we have to bring men from Holland, who become weakened by the fatigues of the voyage, while the subjects of the Portuguese, who live in the country, are fresh and full of health.

For, although the Portuguese have an insufficient number of men in the Indias, to attend to all matters that arise, and at the same time defend themselves against our nation, they can send men there much easier than we. Vessels from Portugal are obliged to go only as far as Goa, where their men disembark and rest. Then they form their fleets from them; and the other Spaniards who come from the Manilles do the same.

If, then, we would also establish ourselves advantageously and solidly in the Indias, we must necessarily have some station, where we may be received and free, on our arrival from Holland. This would be the means of great profits.

Refreshments could be found there ready for the crews and for the vessels. That would increase our reputation among the Indian princes, who as yet have not dared repose entire confidence in us. The natives are sufficiently convinced that the Dutch are a good race, and more gentle and tractable than the Spaniards. “But,” they say, “what good does that do us? The Dutch come here in passing, and only while on their journey. As soon as their vessels are laden, they return.

After that we are abandoned to the Spaniards and Portuguese, against whom we are powerless to defend ourselves. They come to pounce upon us, because we have traded with the Dutch, their enemies. On the other hand, if we attach ourselves to the Spanish, they, at least, protect us in our needs. On the contrary, although the Dutch should come with forces sufficient to protect us, we fear nothing from them; they do not treat us as enemies. Even though we trade with the Portuguese, the Dutch allow us to live quietly, and we have only to be careful of those who molest us. Consequently our best plan is to favor the Portuguese, lest they annihilate us.”

Such are the reflections of all the Indians. Besides the Portuguese do their best to persuade them that we have no forces, that we are but a rabble, who scarcely have fixed habitations in our own country, and quite far from being able to make lasting settlements in the Indias. As for them, they are established there with men who wish to live there. Therefore it is necessary for us to seek means by which to gain the Indians, and make them understand that we have forces, and wish also to become established among them. If not, one must recognize that our affairs will prosper ill.

The commerce of the Indias consists chiefly:

1. Pepper

This is loaded at Bantam, Jahor, Patane, Queda, and Achin

2. Cloves

This is loaded at Amboina and the Moluccas

3. Nutmeg and Mace, or the rind of the nutmeg

This is loaded at Banda

4. Cambaie

5. Coromandel coast

6. Chinese and Japanese coasts.

If the commerce of each of these is not managed by one nation, whether the Portuguese or others, it will happen that one will destroy the other.

It will cause the price of merchandise in the Indias to advance, and a low price will be paid for them in Europe.

However, in regard to pepper, it is impossible for us to get the commerce all to ourselves; for, besides the Portuguese, the English have also undertaken the navigation to Bantam.

They have their trading-posts and houses, and are trading there peacefully, while we are at war against the Portuguese.

We defend Bantam and the English together, while they enjoy there the profits that cost them neither defenses, blood, nor any annoyance.

[The king of Bantam is too young to negotiate with, and too much money would be spent uselessly. For the natives throughout the Indies would not hesitate to violate any treaty in any peril or to their own profit.]

Besides we are at peace with the English, and it would be unjust to try to find means to exclude them from a commerce which they have already commenced. But measures can easily be taken to prevent them from entering into the commerce of other spices. In regard to pepper, we would have to make it serve as a ballast. By this means we could give it so cheaply that the other nations, finding scarcely any profit in it longer, would be obliged to cease trading in it themselves, without counting on our part our profits from the other merchandise.

For, according to my opinion, we could easily attract all the commerce of nutmegs and mace. For this purpose, instead of seizing Banda, and building a fort there, which would cost considerable, and give us a bad reputation among the Indian princes, the following is what I think that we should do.

As the king of Macassar is a powerful prince, whose country is densely populated, and well supplied with rice and all manner of food; and as he furnishes them to Malacca and Banda: it would be necessary to make a treaty with him, and to send him three vessels with two hundred men for his country.

This number, together with the Macassar men, would be sufficient to attack Banda, and we would promise the king to deliver it into his hands, without claiming any recompense for this aid, except that no other nation but our own could load merchandise there, and that the nutmegs and mace would be taken annually at a fixed price, namely, at the selling price at the time of the expedition.

[Matelief is certain that the king of Macassar will acquiesce, and would also probably be willing to build a trading-house for the Dutch. Other conditions for the security of Banda might also be imposed in the treaty.]

Of the clove-trade, it is very difficult for us to render ourselves masters. We have the product of Amboina, Luho, and Cambelo; but not that yielded by the Moluccas. The only means of obtaining it is to drive the Spaniards from Ternate, and it can easily be imagined that the task is not easy. However I shall not hesitate to write here my thought concerning the matter.

The thing does not appear impossible to me, if one wishes to build on a firm foundation. This would require a return to the Malacca affair. For had the Portuguese lost Malacca, they could not easily go from Goa to reënforce the Moluccas; and I do not think there would be much trouble in preventing the sending of supplies to Ternate from the Manilles.

First, we should have to send three or four vessels to the king of Mindanao, whose country is densely inhabited, and who, as report runs, can launch fifty caracoas.

All this fleet would go to Panama or Panati [i.e., Panay] which is near the Manilles, and where there is a place named Otting [i.e., Oton], guarded by but eighteen Spanish soldiers with about the same number of other inhabitants, so that in all there are but forty whites. This place would be destroyed, or if the blacks of Mindanao wished to keep it, it would be given them, for it is a country abounding in rice and several other foods, which are transported to Ternate.

Thence I would suggest going directly to the Manilles to destroy all the vessels in their ports, so that they could not aid Ternate.

Immediately a vessel of one hundred and sixty or two hundred tons would be sent back to Mindanao, which would cross with the king’s caracoas to the strait of Tagima, to capture the vessels that should try still to go to Ternate, because there is no other route. After capturing one or two of them, no other vessels would dare to try it, so that Ternate would perish from famine. For did we try at present to overpower the island by force, I believe that the Spaniards could fortify it so strongly, and have so many men there, that large armies would be required to drive them out.

It would be difficult for them to provide Ternate with cloth, for the little taken there now is brought by the Chinese to the Manilles. This want of cloth would not fail to trouble the inhabitants, and it would have to be sent from Malacca, and that could not be done easily. If a galley could also be taken to Ternate, it would greatly annoy the Spaniards….

The commerce of China depends moreover upon Malacca. If the Portuguese were driven from that place, the Chinese would have to give up that traffic….

The commerce of cotton stuffs at Coromandel is of great importance, for all the inhabitants of the Indias dress in those stuffs, and must have them at any price. There are different styles for each nation, according to their taste, and they make them so in different places … If Malacca were taken from the Portuguese, they would have no further favorable opportunity for the trade in cloth….

If no means are found to besiege Malacca again, the Portuguese might make use of their fustas to hinder our trade with Coromandel. For, since this entire coast is low, and the fustas draw but little water, they could always station themselves between the shore and our vessels. Besides it is very dangerous for vessels to anchor there. If the enemy is spry, he could carry the news to Goa in one week, whence they could easily despatch their fleets against us.

If the Portuguese could be driven from Malacca, they would have to renounce trade on the Coromandel coast; for they would have no safe course, should they wish to get cloth, and they could gain nothing, for the expense would overbalance the profit.

All the commerce of the Portuguese in the East Indies depends on Malacca.

After that, the inhabitants of Bantam would be reasonable, when they would see us in fixed establishments, and would understand that since the English had no other commerce in the Indias than that of pepper, they would not care to make frequent voyages, or great expenses.

The pepper of Jambeo, Andragyri, and other points, that is taken to Bantam, would be taken to Malacca, where, also, cloth for the return cargo would be found.

I have not learned whether the Portuguese have any strength at Bengale. All whom I have heard speak of that country say that a good commerce can be obtained there….

It would be advisable to send two vessels to Arracan to try to trade. Besides the king is very anxious for us to go there.

A Portuguese, one Philippe de Britto, has a fort there, with a garrison of eighty men.

This fort is fifty leagues inland, and Britto holds the entire country in check. Although the king of Arracan is powerful, he has been unable as yet to find means for driving out this Portuguese. This alarms all the kingdom of Pegu, especially since it is annoyed by civil wars. That country has immense wealth, especially in precious gems.

I do not believe that anything can be done with Cambaie while the Portuguese have forts on the Malabar coast, and while the king is not better disposed toward us. We must wait until he knows us better, and until his mind is disabused concerning the Spaniards.

For, until he gives us permission to trade in his ports, we would always encounter great danger, since large vessels can not enter. Besides that country is so near Goa, that the Portuguese would be notified as soon as we arrived there, and would pounce upon us with their forces, so that we could hope for neither help nor protection.

All the above points to Malacca’s importance, for the establishment that we wish to make in the Indias. Therefore, for that reason, we should reflect on it well. For, in short, it is time now for us to assure ourselves of a fixed place and of a retreat. And this place or that place that one might select, would cost immense sums before it could reach the present condition of Malacca. Besides it will be very difficult to find a place so advantageous.