Maharlikanism Maharlikanism
Rule 11

Cross Ownership, Market Abuse And Anti-competitive Behavior

September 30, 2021 9 minutes  • 1707 words
Table of contents

Section 1. General Principle.

No Electric Power Industry Participant or any other Person may engage in any anti-competitive behavior including, but not limited to, cross-subsidization, price or market manipulation, false or deceptive marketing, or other unfair trade practices detrimental to the encouragement and protection of Contestable Markets or the WESM.

Section 2. Scope of Application.

This Rule shall apply to all Persons, including all Electric Power Industry Participants, such as but not limited to Generation Companies, subsidiaries and Affiliates of Generation Companies, stockholders and officials of Generation Companies, IPP Administrators, DUs, Suppliers, NAPOCOR, and the TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire.

Section 3. Prohibition of Cross Ownership.

a As per Section 45, no Generation Company, IPP Administrators, Distribution Utility or Supplier, their respective subsidiaries, Affiliates, stockholders, directors or officers or other entity engaged in generating and supplying electricity specified by ERC, shall hold any interest, directly or indirectly, in the TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire, or the Market Operator.

b) TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire and any of its stockholders, directors or officers or any of their relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, legitimate or common law, shall not hold any interest, whether directly or indirectly, in any Generation Company, IPP Administrators, Distribution Utility or Supplier. (c) Except for ex officio government-appointed representatives, no Person who is an officer or director of the TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire shall be an officer or director of any Generation Company, IPP Administrators, Distribution Utility or Supplier. (d) This Section shall not apply to PSALM in the course of its Privatization of NAPOCOR assets pursuant to Sec. 47 . Section 4. Limits on Concentration of Ownership, Control of Installed Generating Capacity. Operation or (a) No company, Related Group or IPP Administrator, singly or in combination, can own, operate or Control more than thirty percent (30 %) of the installed generating capacity of a Grid and/or twenty-five percent (25%) of the national installed generating capacity: Provided, That such restrictions shall not apply to PSALM or NAPOCOR during the time that its assets are being privatized pursuant to Section 47 of the Act and isolated grids that are not connected to the high voltage transmission system. The ERC shall determine the installed generating capacity in a Grid and the national installed generating capacity. (b) The capacity of such facility shall be credited to the entity controlling the terms and conditions of the prices or quantities of the output of such capacity sold in the market in cases where different entities own the same Generation Facility. In cases where different Persons own, operate or Control the same Generation Facility, the capacity of such facility shall be credited to the Person controlling the capacity of the Generation Facility. Section 5. Limits on Bilateral Supply Contracts by a Distribution Utility. (a) A Distribution Utility may enter into bilateral power supply contracts subject to the provisions of Section 5 of Rule 30 on NAPOCOR Offer of Transition Supply Contracts and a review by the ERC: Provided, That such review shall only be required for a Distribution Utility whose level of Open Access has not reached household demand level. (b) No Distribution Utility shall be allowed to source from bilateral power supply contracts more than fifty percent (50%) of its total demand from an Affiliate engaged in generation, but such limitation shall not prejudice contracts entered into prior to the effective date . Page 42 of 100This limitation shall apply regardless of whether demand is expressed in terms of capacity or energy. Section 6. Encouragement of Participation in the WESM. For the first five (5) years from the establishment of the WESM, no Distribution Utility shall source more than ninety percent (90%) of its total demand from bilateral power supply contracts. Section 7. ERC Responsibilities. (a) ERC shall enforce the competitive safeguards specified in this Rule in order to promote true market competition and prevent harmful monopoly and market power abuse. However, ERC shall not apply the limitations specified in this Rule to isolated grids that are not connected to the Grid. (b) ERC shall have the authority to determine the appropriate Grid or Grids to use in the application of this Rule when two or more of the three separate Grids become sufficiently interconnected to constitute a single Grid or as conditions may otherwise permit. (c) ERC shall, within one (1) year from the effectivity , promulgate Competition Rules to ensure and promote competition, encourage market development and customer choice and discourage or penalize abuse of market power, cartelization and any anti- competitive or discriminatory behavior, or unfair trade practice that distorts competition or harms consumers. Such Rules shall define relevant markets for the purpose of establishing abuse or misuse of market power, areas of isolated grids that are not connected to the high voltage transmission system, and the reportorial requirements of Electric Power Industry Participants as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of Section 45 . (d) ERC shall, motu proprio, monitor and penalize any market power abuse or anti-competitive or unduly discriminatory act or behavior, or any unfair trade practice that distorts competition or harms consumers, by any Electric Power Industry Participant. Upon a finding of a prima facie case that an Electric Power Industry Participant has engaged in such act or behavior, the ERC shall after due notice and hearing, stop and redress the same. Such remedies shall, without limitation, include the separation of the business activities of an Electric Power Industry Participant into different juridical entities, the imposition of bid or price controls, issuance of injunctions in accordance with the Rules of Court, divestment or disgorgement of excess profits, and imposition of fines and penalties pursuant to Section 46 . (e) ERC shall, within one (1) year from the effectivity , promulgate rules and regulations providing for a complaint procedure that, without limitation, provides the accused party with its rights to due process. Page 43 of 100Section 8. Anti-Competitive Practices. Behavior and Other Unfair Trade The ERC shall promulgate Competition Rules prohibiting, and specifying appropriate penalties and other remedies for, any contract, combination or conspiracy that unreasonably restricts competition in any market for electricity, or any conduct that constitutes an abuse of market power or an attempted monopolization of any market for electricity, including but not limited to the following: (a) Fixing prices of products or services: Electric Power Industry Participants that are competitors shall not enter into any agreement or understanding, tacit or explicit, to fix, peg or stabilize the price of any product or service. Price fixing shall be deemed to include agreements on bids, price floors, price ceilings, pricing formulas and resale prices, and agreements on credit or any other terms of a transaction between a buyer and a seller. (b) Fixing output of products or services: Electric Power Industry Participants that are competitors shall not enter into any agreement or understanding, tacit or explicit, to fix, limit or otherwise determine their output of any product or service. (c) Customer, Product, Service or Territorial Divisions: Electric Power Industry Participants that are competitors shall not enter into any agreement or understanding, tacit or explicit, as to the customers or the geographic territories they will serve, or the products or services they will sell. (d) Tying: Electric Power Industry Participants shall not use a position of market power to condition the sale of one product or service on the purchase of another product or service. No Distribution Utility shall make access to its Distribution System contingent upon the purchase of generation, metering, billing or other services. (e) Physical or Economic Withholding: Electric Power Industry Participants shall not use physical operating practices or bidding strategies that limit the market participation of a generation unit under conditions that will result in significant increases in market prices. (f) Discriminatory provision of regulated distribution or transmission services: Regulated distribution and transmission services shall be provided on a basis that is not unduly discriminatory. Examples of unduly discriminatory behavior include, but not limited to the following: (i) A Distribution Utility or TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire refuses to interconnect Generation Company, IPP Administrator, or Supplier other than for reasons of system security or reliability or reasonable financial or credit considerations pursuant to the Grid or Distribution Codes or commission of acts constituting grounds for suspension of the service under any applicable rule and regulation. Page 44 of 100(ii) A Distribution Utility or TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire gives a Generation Company, IPP Administrator, or Supplier, including without limitation any of the Distribution Utility’s Affiliates, any preference or advantage over any other Generation Company, IPP Administrator, or Supplier in processing a request for Transmission or Distribution of Electricity. (iii) A Distribution Utility or TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire gives a Generation Company, IPP Administrator, or Supplier, including without limitation any of the Distribution Utility’s Affiliates, any preference or advantage in the dissemination or disclosure of customer or transmission or Distribution System information, and any such information that has not been made available to all Electric Power Industry Participants at the same time and in a non-discriminatory manner. (iv) A Distribution Utility or TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire provides any preference or advantage to any Supplier in the disclosure of information about operational status and availability of the Distribution System and transmission system. (v) A Distribution Utility does not provide all regulated services, and does not apply Distribution Wheeling Charges to any Supplier that is not an Affiliate, in the same manner as it does for itself or its Affiliates. TRANSCO or its Buyer or Concessionaire shall provide all regulated services and shall apply Transmission Charges to any Electric Power Industry Participant in the same manner as it does for PSALM or NAPOCOR.

(g) Misrepresentation or false advertising of a Distribution Utility: A Distribution Utility or its Affiliate shall not state or imply that any distribution service provided to an Affiliate is inherently superior, solely on the basis of Affiliate’s relationship with the Distribution Utility, to that provided to any other Supplier.

(h) Cross-Subsidization: Consistent with Section 26 , a Distribution Utility shall not use its revenues or resources from regulated distribution services to reduce the cost or price of its competitive services (generation or supply).